

**"Is Nuclear Arms Control Dead?"**

**Ms. Rose Gottemoeller**

**Former NATO Deputy Secretary General and former Undersecretary of  
State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs**

**&**

**Mr. Tim Morrison**

**Former Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National Security  
Council, Trump White House**

**Dinner Conversation**

**Project for Media and National Security**

**George Washington School of Media and Public Affairs**

**15 January 2020**

**Moderator:** Welcome to all of you. I know coming out for an evening away from families and friends to discuss nuclear weapons isn't for everyone. So we have the really hard core national security reporters here tonight! Thanks for coming.

This dinner and the one coming in March are made possible by support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. I hope many of you will also join us on March 17<sup>th</sup>, we'll talk about that at the end. But I want to specifically thank Carl Robichaud and Patricia Nicholas of Carnegie Corporation of New York for their efforts and for their support that's making these two conversations possible.

I also want to welcome just a few other people who aren't journalists who are in the room. First of all, two former colleagues of Rose's, Michael Elliott, retired Senior DoD executive who was integral to the development of policy related top nuclear weapons and to the international negotiations which Rose led at one point, that led to the current treaty, New START. And Richard Trout, who is a retired naval intelligence officer, served as intelligence advisor for officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, and those who were negotiating the nuclear arms control issues with the Russians. They could be the speakers tonight, but instead they're just here. I hope you'll pipe up when appropriate.

And then two from our own university here, from George Washington University. George Washington University Professor Hugh Gusterson, an anthropologist who's working on a book about nuclear weapon scientists since the Cold War. An anthropologist. Different. And Brian Radzinsky, also of GWU. He's Deputy

**Professional Word Processing & Transcribing  
(801) 556-7255**

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

Director of the Nuclear Security Working Group which isn't just GW, but it's housed here. So thank you also, Brian, for coming.

There's a variety of age groups around the table here. I'm on the older end, so I'm a child of the Cold War, and I remember the air raid drills. I remember being instructed to get under my school desk, and I never quite understood why that would be safer, but anyway, we did what we were told. Anyway, it was something to do and it built consciousness. I don't know.

Then came the first arms control agreements and a halt to atmospheric tests and finally reductions. I think we all had a sense, and perhaps we still do, that the world is off the nuclear hair trigger, in a safer situation where nuclear weapons were being reduced in numbers rather than increased. We had the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty banning ballistic and cruise missiles between a range of 500 and, what was it, 5,500 kilometers. And the Cold War ended. I spent much of my journalistic career covering the Cold War. Its end was a surprise, basically.

But some of you are younger than I and for you perhaps, for many reporters covering national security since 9/11, national security has basically meant counterterrorism, and it's only in the last few years that we've started to now talk about big power competition again. The subject of nuclear weapons is back in the pages of the newspapers and on our broadcasts.

Under Obama the New START agreement set limits of 1,550 warheads deployed and 700 nuclear capable aircraft. Those limits on Russia and the U.S. And in Berlin in 2013 President Obama proposed a further cut of one-third.

But now, as I say, nukes are back in the news. What with Russia developing and announcing new types of delivery systems that it either will deploy or dreams of deploying, actually with a fair amount of fanfare, which is interesting. China building a serious force of at least 400 warheads, and we don't know where they'll go from that. And now our own country, our own administration is starting its \$1.2 trillion over 30-year modernization of the United States arsenal.

History is marching on, meanwhile. Russia's seizure of Crimea from Ukraine has arguably made it more difficult to make deals with Russia on anything, including this. The U.S. has charged

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

that Russia has been violating the INF Treaty and so President Trump pulled out of it. He's also pulled out of the multinational agreement constraining Iran's nuclear program. And he's considering whether to withdraw from the 1992 Open Skies Agreement and whether or not to renew the New START agreement for an additional five years, which it runs out in 2021.

So the question tonight that we're going to think about, hear from speakers and discuss amongst each other, is whether the days of nuclear arms control are basically over, or whether we may get back to writing treaties. And if we do, what will they look like, and what will that look like?

We have two really very distinguished main speakers tonight. I know they are the draw, they're why you're here.

Rose Gottemoeller, a U.S. diplomat who was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO until July of last year. Pretty recently.

**Gottemoeller:** October.

**Moderator:** October. This is wrong. Under Secretary General Stoltenberg, and she previously served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and was the chief negotiator of the follow-on START agreement, the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty that we currently are under.

Finally, I just want to mention she has a master's degree from this school, the Elliott School of George Washington University, as does Tim, but from the law school.

Tim is a Republican foreign policy expert who served until pretty recently as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security under then National Security Advisor John Bolton, and prior to that was NSC Senior Director for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. He served almost five years on the staff of then Senator Kyl, Navy Reserve Intelligence Officer, are you still? And as I say, has a JD from this august university.

I thought I'd start by asking them to each, Rose first, just talk for five or ten minutes to us about, well, are the days of arms control over? If they're not, where are we headed? And how would you describe the U.S.-Russian relationship on the subject of nuclear weapons at this stage, Rose?

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

**Gottemoeller:** Thank you very much, David, and thank you all for coming out tonight. It's really wonderful to see so many old colleagues and friends, people I've worked with over the years and to meet some new people as well. So it's quite an honor and a pleasure for me to be here and to be here on this podium with Tim Morrison who has been a counterpart for many years working these issues and was instrumental in forming some of the tough positions in the New START Treaty, making us face up to some of the tough decisions and make sure we at least tried to get them right. So I appreciate the opportunity to be on this panel with Tim tonight.

I want to say yes, there's a future for nuclear arms control and I want to again point to the fact that this administration has actually shown the way because they have highlighted the necessity of bringing new players into the nuclear arms control negotiating environment, and specifically the Chinese. So I do applaud this effort, and I think it is essentially the direction of the future not only to bring the Chinese around to the necessity of negotiated restraint on weapons of mass destruction and particularly nuclear weapons, but also to begin to think about the other nuclear weapon states outside of the NPT, particularly India and Pakistan and focus on how we ensure that we do not face a highly nuclearized security environment in the future.

So I do think that it is valuable to work hard now to try to get the Chinese to play ball. They are not there yet, and we can talk about that more tonight, but I think that has been a valuable door that has been pushed open by the present administration.

As far as the U.S.-Russian arms control and nuclear relationship is now, it's well established. Fifty years plus. The U.S. and first the Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation, have been working together. We have a good, I think, mutual understanding of the value of negotiated restraint to our own national security interests and I want to underscore for this audience that the only reason we should enter into arms control negotiations and agreements is if they serve fundamental U.S. national security interests. That is the reason we should be engaged and involved in this issue.

So I do think that we can continue to move forward with the Russians in constraining particularly strategic nuclear weapon

Professional Word Processing & Transcribing  
(801) 556-7255

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

systems. We can talk about that a bit more as well. But I do see that particularly as we are trying to modernize our nuclear arsenal over the next decade that we need to have a predictable and stable environment in which to do so. That is why I would continue to argue for straightforward dialogue and discussion with the Russians in the realm of strategic security, strategic stability. I would continue to argue for the extension of New START which is in my way the most basic way to provide for a stable and predictable environment in this nuclear arena. And also I would argue that we need to think hard about the future and where we see the Russians going.

To me it's a bit interesting that Putin has decided to trumpet so many new kinds of modern nuclear weapons because they already have extraordinarily capable ICBMs, SLBMs and bomber weapons. They don't really need these, some of them fantastic new weapons they've been developing like the Burevestnik, the nuclear propelled cruise missile. They can make the [rubble bounce] here in the United States a million times over with what they already have. So I think it's a good question of what they are trying to achieve essentially on the, in some ways, the public stage. Putin said again today in the context, or yesterday I guess, in the context of his interview, his big national security pronouncement that he makes every year at this time that we have weapons that others don't have. Yes, that's a good thing. But I think we all need to ask ourselves seriously, essentially what does that mean to strategic stability? And are there ways that we can, we must continue to ensure our own defense. There's no question about it. But are there ways that we can begin to talk to the Russians about the expensive redundancy that they are pursuing with some of these new weapon systems, some of which are quite dangerous to deploy and operate. Burevestnik, of course, is an excellent example with its highly radioactive propulsion system.

I guess those are some opening thoughts I'll just put on the table to start us going, and I look forward to our discussion.

**Morrison:** I would say first, I appreciate the invitation. Some of you are still paying off GW law school loans. I also appreciate the dinner. [Laughter]. But I agree with almost everything, actually I agree with everything Rose said with a few minor alterations as to the conclusion.

I think the point about the new systems, the systems that he

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

exhibited in March of 2018 is spot on. Putin is, he's a magician. This is classic Putin misdirection. He is presiding over and probably hastening the decline of Russia as a great power and is classic Putin trying to inflate Russia's importance in the world when all the available statistics show that they are now a middle power. With the exception of nuclear weapons they're a Mafia-run gas station with a lot of nuclear weapons.

I think the point about the new type of systems, this is classic Putin trying to focus us on what's over here so hopefully we don't pay attention to what's over here. For example, thousands and thousands of non-strategic weapons that he's thus far successfully exempted from arms control.

So for me, a lot of the attention is on the New START Treaty, the extension, and for and I think where the administration is, although I've been out for two months, and in this administration two months is a lifetime. The treaty doesn't expire until February 2021. As Rose said, extension needs no Senate action. I believe it has to be, an extension has to be ratified by the Duma, but to be honest, the Duma's not a serious legislature. The hills in Siberia are full of people who were in the Duma who thought they could be independent and now they're breaking rocks.

So for me it's not about extension or not extending, it's about what else can we accomplish? And I appreciate what Rose had to say about the administration has tried to open the aperture to other weapons, for example the non-strategic weapons, as well as other actors. For example, China.

So I think the way the administration is pursuing it, there's a sense that we have leverage now. Putin is clamoring for an extension. I think he's clamoring for that predictability. He likes the treaty. It covers virtually every type of U.S. nuclear weapon, whereas it covers a declining percentage of his nuclear arsenal.

All of our weapons essentially at this point are strategic. And before Mike Elliott jumps on me, with the possible exception of the B61 life extension program that will essentially keep being a non-strategic weapon and we will only have strategic gravity bombs. But every weapon we have will be limited by arms control and that is just not the case for Russia.

So we know Putin wants an extension. We have leverage. Let's

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

use it.

If we extend now, is it at all likely that Putin will negotiate after that on any of the things we care about? No. He'll sit back and he'll wait until 2026 and try to leverage it for something else at that point. He will, in all likelihood, still be in some leadership status in Russia in 2026.

From my perspective, we should not be discussing an extension. We should be discussing how to make progress on those other objectives. So I'll avoid talking too much about what I consider to be the flaws of New START in order to maximize question time, but I think you have to sort of step back, and I think INF was a forcing function for the President.

So if we think about where the President is trying to go, there's a question of why China? The President gets, as we all know, a daily intelligence brief, and I think in the course of dealing with some of the policy question she had to deal with in the intelligence briefings he was getting, he saw, for example, INF, and he saw the work that had been done by the previous administration and he saw the choices that he had to make about how to handle this treaty. And from his perspective, he saw a treaty that obviously China was not at all a party of. Russia was effectively not a party to because they had exempted themselves from the treaty by violating it fortuitously. And if you look at the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, for the first time the Trump administration designated China as our strategic competitor. And in fact if you look at the language, it's fairly clear that the administration views China as the greatest threat and Russia is sort of a slightly less important threat but certainly a tier above Iran and North Korea and countering violent extremism.

So it was very consistent for the President to take a look at in the INF context and other details about what China is doing with their nuclear forces, to look at the fact that China had managed to be able to be, to not be able to fit in any of the [archaic] treaties dealing with nuclear weapons. They are in the Biological Weapons Convention. They are in the Chemical Weapons Convention. They have signed but not ratified the [CDBC]. So they do have some experience in arms control but they have not joined the future of arms control.

So I think from the President's perspective, he sees China as

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

clearly a great strategic security competitor. He sees that China has been able to avoid getting involved in things like INF. And I think for him the question is well how do I reconcile China as such a great strategic competitor but not a party to arms control? I think that's where you see him looking at the importance of adding China.

The question we asked from the administration, when I was still a member of it, if not now, when? If it's not important to add China arms control when there are 400 weapons, do we wait until they have 800 weapons? Do we need to wait until they have 1550 weapons to come into arms control? From our perspective, that just didn't make any sense.

So we often get a lot of questions about how do you bring China in? I have to be careful because I helped develop some of the ideas that they may still be talking about, but one of the points I would make is, think about the advantage that China has enjoyed by effectively being the only great power in Asia that can deploy intermediate range missiles. That is now gone. We tested in August a ground-launched cruise missile that looks a lot like sea-launched cruise missiles that we already deploy and that they know we can deploy in great quantities. They saw in December us test a ground-launched ballistic missile that again I think they're [inaudible] not to see that that looks a lot like other systems that we can quickly modify and deploy.

So I do think that where we are going with INF gives us, that's just one example, leverage over China to explain to them the benefits to their security for coming into the arms control environment.

Now I would be critical of the administration. I wrote an OpEd in December about my concerns about where the administration is going. The fact that they are not moving quickly enough. I, for one, think that we need a Special Envoy for Arms Control. In the previous administration we had Rose negotiating New START as the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control. We don't have an Assistant Secretary for Arms Control right now at the State Department. Rose was the Under Secretary for Arms Control. We don't have an Under Secretary for Arms Control in the Trump administration at this point. So there's a lot of good people in the administration, but there's nobody who has it as their responsibility right now to negotiate such a treaty. And so I worry about the ability for the administration to implement the



Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

President's direction. And for me, one of the solutions is a Special Envoy.

I will say that there's a team over in Vienna I believe right now talking to the Russians, carrying on the Strategic Security Dialogue framework that then Deputy Secretary Sullivan, now our Ambassador in Moscow, held last July to talk to the Russians about arms control, so that is happening. But again, I'm a little bit concerned that we don't have that single point of focus for arms control right now. Rose, I'm sure, can talk about just how busy her days were as Under Secretary. That portfolio includes arms control, foreign military sales, export controls, nonproliferation. That's a busy job. We need somebody who has it as their focus to negotiate an arms control treaty.

I'll make one last point. I mentioned I think, I believe the administration is in Vienna now talking to the Russians. It was reported a couple of weeks ago that the Chinese have asked for a similar dialogue. They came up to the administration I believe in October at the UN First Committee to say essentially we hear the President talking about trilateral arms control. What does that mean? Will you come talk to us about it? It's interesting to me that despite the administration inviting them to a Strategic Security Dialogue, they haven't yet accepted the invitation. I put my money on them deciding whether or not to accept that invitation that they themselves solicited once they see how things go with the Russians in Vienna.

But I do worry from my perspective that we have this piece of leverage because of Putin's interest in the New START Treaty, but time is not on the President's side. We are going to get to a point where there will have to be a decision about whether or not to extend the New START Treaty and if we've burned all the calendar where we could have been talking to the Russians and the Chinese about the future state of arms control, we're going to be in a position where the President is left with a binary question of extend or not extend, and from my perspective as a guy who used to go to work every day to give the President more options, that would be an unfortunate position to sort of put the President in that box.

But that's just sort of how I see the world. I'm happy to take any questions.

**Moderator:** A couple of things I forgot to say at the top, let me

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

just put in because everyone's taking notes.

First of all, this is on the record. Secondly, there will be a transcript in a day or two so you don't have to take every single word down if it's not for tomorrow. We'll do a transcript, it will be on our web site in 48 hours or something like that.

**Gottemoeller:** I just wanted to ask, and I've been wondering about it for a while, I agree with you, this is in danger of turning into a mud fest. I agree with you about --

**Morrison:** How likely is that to happen, Rose? [Laughter].

**Gottemoeller:** No, but I agree with about missile proliferation, absolutely. And the Chinese have been proliferating very capable, accurate missiles. The Russians have been proliferating very capable, accurate missiles including the SSC-8 or 9M729. Where I ask a question in my mind is how much does that extend to a burst in warheads? I do not see that burst in warheads. And oftentimes, to be honest, I see a kind of confusion when we talk about or I hear folks from the administration talking about a burst in missile capacity, weapon systems conveyed in that way. But I don't see the same burst in building warheads.

Now maybe you have other information, but I just don't see it. So I wonder if you could clarify that point. But I agree 100 percent that we have to get after missile proliferation. There's no question about it. And particularly with the demise of the INF Treaty.

**Morrison:** Can you just elaborate? The burst in missile proliferation, burst in warhead production?

**Gottemoeller:** There are a lot of new missile being built and deployed by Russia, and there's a [inaudible] news story talking about the Iskander at the lower end of the range that's been out there a long time. Now they have the new intermediate range ground-launched system. And they've got very capable new sea- and air-launched systems well, the Russian cruise missiles, air-breathers. It's the same, we've seen this progression on the Chinese side as well, building up their missile arsenal. But as far as I understand, a lot of those are for conventional deployment. I don't see a great big burst in new warhead construction for either the Russian or the Chinese warheads.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

**Morrison:** On the point about the Russian missiles, are you for example talking about the SS-25 going from a single missile to being replaced by the SS-27 that could carry multiple warheads, let's say greater than three, and you're asking whether or not we have data that suggests the Russians are building enough warheads to fully upload?

**Gottemoeller:** No. I'm making note of the fact that the intermediate range systems and the shorter range systems are expanding rapidly, and these are the kind of systems that pose particular threats in Asia, for example, to our carrier battle groups. So I really think we have an important [inaudible] security reasons focused on getting this expansion in missile capability past the other [controls].

**Morrison:** I guess the way I would put it, just to be on the safe side, I'll just quote General Ashley. This SS growth is primarily driven by a significant projected increase in the number of Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia is adding military capabilities to its existing stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons including those employable by ships, aircraft and ground forces. These nuclear warheads include theater and tactical range systems that Russia relies on to deter and defeat NATO, and interestingly China, in a conflict. General Ashley gave us a number. He said that we assess Russia possesses up to 2000 such non-strategic nuclear warheads not covered by the New START Treaty.

**Gottemoeller:** Okay, that's been there a while. A number that's been there a while, so it's not a sudden jump. That's the only point I'm making.

**Morrison:** We could go back and look at the entirety of the speech, but General Ashley did say, what General Ashley did was he took all of the key judgments from the various NIEs and Intelligence Committee assessments, ICAs, took those key judgments and essentially worked across the IC, worked across all the collectors to declassify those key judgments. And he said very clearly that a significant element in the growth of the Russian stockpile is those non-strategic weapons. I agree with you, those are significant threats we have to worry about.

But China can take out an aircraft carrier, for example, without a nuclear warhead. The maneuvering missile that they have.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

**Moderator:** General Ashley is the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Most people in the room know that, but I'm putting it on the tape.

Tim, why don't I ask you this. Do you think President Trump is likely to respond favorably to President Putin's offer to extend the New START Treaty? And should he? And what are the upsides and downsides of doing so?

**Morrison:** I think he's going to have to answer that question and I think the way the administration's been thinking about it, again, because this treaty doesn't expire until 2021, in February, and because he has larger priorities for arms control, I don't think the question of extending or not extending the New START Treaty is something that he's going to really seriously contemplate until much later this year. If we get to a point where these dialogues with Russia and China seem to not be going anywhere, that will inform his calculus, I'm sure. But I think from his perspective because it is such a pro forma matter to extend the treaty, I don't think he views this as something he needs to do now because of the cost to the leverage he would have by having something that Putin wants. So I think he's going to defer that decision until he feels like he has to make it.

**Moderator:** Which is about February of next year?

**Morrison:** I think --

**Moderator:** That's assuming he's still in office, of course.

**Morrison:** February of next year is the date by which it has to be extended. I would expect he would look at it sometime in the fall/winter of this year, assess where we are with the trilateral track and decide, okay, is this treaty based on the success or failure of the trilateral initiative? Is this treaty still in our interest?

**Moderator:** Rose, if Trump is reelected and does not extend New START, what are the implications?

**Gottemoeller:** Well, there are several implications. I already referred to one of them. In my view it makes a very unpredictable environment for the modernization of U.S. strategic forces over the next decade. That is primarily because of access the Russians have to capacity and capability. They do have a lot

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

of warheads, I don't dispute that. By the way, the last exchange between Tim and me, what I do dispute is that there's been a big jump in construction of new non-strategic nuclear warheads in [inaudible] time. That's the main difference I think in our points of view.

But they do have a lot of warheads and they have a lot of warheads in storage, so they have the capacity to upload. And it's particularly concerning as they're beginning to deploy -- they are at the end of their nuclear force modernization period now. They are beginning to deploy the new heavy missile, the so-called Sarmat missile. It has what we used to call a lot of throw weight where you can put a fairly large number of objects on the front of it, whether warheads or other kinds of things like decoys to get around missile defense.

The Russians could put us in a very unpredictable [inaudible] rather quickly, and I think from the perspective of our own national security we should be looking for predictability and stability as we are proceeding forward with the modernization of our strategic nuclear arsenal.

I do endorse and support the effort of modernization that is going on, and I happen to believe that maintenance of New START over the next decade is the best way to ensure that it moves forward within budget and in a way that will ensure timely deployment of the modernized forces that we need. Without having to worry about new targeting challenges coming out of it from the Russian Federation.

The other major point I think that's important to bear in mind is the benefit to our national intelligence with regard to what's going on in the Russian strategic forces that accrue from having not only inspectors on the ground. People have been focused on on-site inspections, but it is the whole panoply of capacity and capability in the verification regime for the New START Treaty that gives us 24x7 insight into the status of Russian nuclear forces. It's particularly related to the notification and the data exchange that the Russians have agreed and now we have a good history from the implementation of the treaty from 2011. Every time they take a missile out of a silo and take it to a maintenance facility they have to notify us that that missile's going to move.

So there are thousands of notifications that have gone into our

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center over the last years since 2011 when the New START Treaty entered into force. This means that we have a 24x7 insight into what's going on in the strategic nuclear forces from the Russian Federation. This is in addition to the on-site inspections which everybody knows about, and by the way the fact that we have now national technical means that are operating unimpeded, or there is a provision in the treaty that is a very traditional provision of non-interference with national technical means. Those are our overhead satellites, radars, and other means of helping to verify what's going on in the treaty.

I attended a very interesting meeting today and I endorse the work that's been going on on this that if New START goes out of force, this notion of non-interference with national technical means as a legal matter would also go away, meaning the Russians would be able to employ more concealment and deception of their deployed missile forces and bomber and submarine forces.

So I do think it's important to bear in mind the full panoply of advantage that we gain from the entire spectrum of verification and monitoring methods that accrue under the New START Treaty, and when that goes away the IC is simply going to have a much harder time knowing what's going on in the guts of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal.

**Morrison:** A couple of points. It's tough to go into a great deal of detail about the benefits to the Intelligence Community from the treaty. To me and whether or not a particular missile has three warheads or six warheads isn't necessarily that important from a perspective of how the Department of Defense, for example, would hold that missile at risk. Is it nice to have the data? Sure. How much does that cost us if we don't have the data? That's a question.

What I worry about is, and Rose was exactly right. The Satan -- they really name missiles well in Russia -- the SF18 carries up to 10 nuclear warheads. The Sarmat will carry more. Ten warheads is not enough for Vladimir Putin. Someone may have an adequacy problem. SS-25, single warhead. SS-27, multiple warheads. They are building in a tremendous upload capability into their nuclear arsenal and the only thing keeping them from uploading those missiles is the New START Treaty which is great until Vladimir Putin decides it's not useful to him anymore, like he decided on the INF Treaty, like he decided on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, like he decides routinely when

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

there's an over-skies flight he doesn't like. This is not a leader who feels constrained by legal obligations. So if that's what's holding us back from those kinds of warheads being deployed, maybe it's time to try a different kind of treat that actually eliminates warheads, which the New START Treaty didn't do.

That's not to say that the calculus at the end of the day doesn't suggest okay, the Russians are playing ball, they're negotiating with us, they've gotten permission from big brother in Beijing. Maybe at that point it makes sense to extend. I think where the administration is, let's try for something better. And if it doesn't work, there will be a calculus about whether or not to extend the current limited treaty, but maybe it will work. If we extend today, we lose our leverage over Vladimir Putin because he's simply not going to be interested in negotiating to limit these other things that he wasn't willing to negotiate over in 2009.

**Moderator:** Tim, you just said that you wanted to see a Special Envoy or someone to deal with this. I don't see who's going to do this between now and January of next year. Who's going to check out, who's going to really test the Russians and the Chinese to see whether or not President Trump should extend that treaty or not? Isn't there a problem?

**Morrison:** Yeah. I've said very clearly both earlier today and back in December in an OpEd that [inaudible] people on the 7<sup>th</sup> Floor in the State Department, that they are failing to provide the President what he's asked for, and they are in effect boxing him in and denying him options to implement the policy he's said he wants to pursue. I agree. There are people who could do it. The decision just hasn't been made to pull that trigger.

**Moderator:** This isn't that large a group, although it's a little sizeable. Why don't just say open season, and anybody who'd like to ask a question should do so.

**Audience:** Patrick [Inaudible] from Defense One. I have two questions for Tim, if you don't mind.

First, when you were looking at a post-INF world, do you have any Asian allied partners in mind who would be really eager to [host] INF missiles like Poland was in the European Theater, that are a partner anxious to host those missiles that would put China in

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

range [inaudible]?

And my second question is, I'm a little confused about this. The stated problem that people have with New START [inaudible] hypersonic platforms.

**Morrison:** That's not necessarily true.

**Audience:** It doesn't cover, well lots of new platforms, lots of new stuff. And it doesn't cover variable yield. And so if you want to create a new treaty with Russia that would cover new platforms and non-strategic weapons and --

**Morrison:** I'm not sure General Hyten said that, because if, for example, they deploy a hypersonic boost glide vehicle on an SS-18 or Sarmat, it will count. And the variable yield issue, I'm also not tracking you because depending upon --

**Audience:** -- non-strategic weapons.

**Morrison:** Non-strategic weapons are not covered, sure. But that's not the same as saying variable yield weapons.

**Audience:** My point is they're building new hypersonic platforms, a variety of new platforms, and they're also building non-strategic nuclear weapons now. So --

**Morrison:** Who's building non-strategic nuclear weapons?

**Audience:** I mean the variable yield weapons that --

**Morrison:** That's not a non-strategic nuclear weapon. The low yield D-5 is a treaty-limited D-5.

**Audience:** What about the new [inaudible]?

**Morrison:** The what?

**Audience:** [Inaudible]. That's a problem with New START where it didn't cover a variety of platforms, and he's also worried about variable yield nuclear weapons and [inaudible].

**Morrison:** I'd have to see what he said, but yeah.

**Audience:** In terms of the question on partners in Asia that



Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

would be interested in hosting post-INF missiles, if you had any that were --

**Morrison:** I think there will be.

**Audience:** Can you name them?

**Morrison:** No. I don't want newspaper articles tomorrow saying former Trump administration official named allies he's talked to about deploying these missiles.

**Audience:** Can you give a number of them? Like how many?

**Morrison:** There are several allies in Asia and Europe who are interested in this capability.

**Moderator:** It makes them a sitting duck, doesn't it?

**Morrison:** They're already sitting ducks. You can't tell me that Poland, for example, isn't already targeted by Russia. They've got to get across the Suwalki Gap if they're going to take Lithuania. But they're already targeted. There's not a point in Europe that Putin isn't already targeting.

**Audience:** Does Poland [inaudible]?

**Morrison:** Is Poland one of what?

**Audience:** [Inaudible].

**Morrison:** No, I think Patrick mentioned Poland in his back banter.

**Audience:** [Inaudible].

**Moderator:** What about Asia?

**Morrison:** I believe there will be Asian partners.

**Moderator:** Several Asian partners?

**Morrison:** I believe there will be several Asian partners.

**Audience:** Do you find that this threat is causing some Asian partners to [feel] the need to kind of balance between Chinese

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

and U.S. influence and now have to pick a side? Or are these countries that have been traditionally more in lock-step with the U.S. --

**Morrison:** I'm not sure how many Asian partners have been balancing between us and China. We've --

**Audience:** In terms of the weapons that they buy, the realities of their neighborhood.

**Morrison:** Vietnam's bigger problem is balancing between us and Russia, not China. That's where they become a CAATSA target. Vietnam and China have fought wars. The Chinese remember being on the losing end of those wars. So yeah, Vietnam has some security decisions that they're making, and they're already benefiting from the trade disputes as companies search for both lower priced labor, because China, one of the downfalls of becoming a middle income country is your labor is less attractive than it used to be. So Vietnam is already benefiting from that. And the general approach from some companies with deep leverage from China in terms of where they want to locate their supply chain from the perspective of not being a subject of the tariff disputes. I think you're also seeing that playing out in some of their security decisions.

Whether Vietnam hosts GLCMs or [GLBMs] I can only fantasize.

**Gottemoeller:** I just want to make a really quick clarifying point. Indeed, the Sarmat heavy missile meets the definition of an ICBM under the treaty. Once the Russians are prepared to deploy the missile, and they've already indicated that it would be a missile that fall under the New START Treaty, and sustained with a boost glide system, the Avangard, which is launched in two stages. And the Russians have already conveyed that because it's launched on the SS-19, they're considering this to fall under the definition of the New START Treaty.

There is a provision in the New START Treaty not for new types of ICBMs, SLBMs or bomber weapons, but for new kinds which that provision was put in the treaty to potentially capture all kinds of new kinds of new technology. So it's possible under the New START Treaty that we could begin a conversation with the Russians about some of these new kinds of weapon systems, but it would require very careful consideration of whether in fact they could and would fall under the definitions of the treaty.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

I would like to stress in this regard, I think it's worthwhile if New START is extended to begin new kinds discussion with the Russians in the context of the treaty, but then to also bear in mind that systems like the Burevestnik is unlikely to be deployed until the mid-2020s anyway when New START would go out of force, if it isn't extended in 2026, it's going out of force in the mid-2020s anyway. So this is something where you could begin a discussion. It could help you to formulate how these missiles would go into a new treaty, would fall under a new treaty.

I think that we ought to be considering how there's perhaps a benefit to extending New START to help us to define and formulate how some of these systems that are concerning to all of us would fall into a new treaty.

**Morrison:** That's absolutely true, but there's also the counterpoint, and correct me if I'm wrong, Rose, on new kinds, the Russians would have to agree with us that they meet the definition of a new kind. So they would negotiate with us over that. And then there's a question of whether the verification and inspections would be adequate to verify what we need to verify about those new kinds. For example, the nuclear powered nuclear armed torpedo, or the nuclear powered nuclear armed cruise missile, or the air-launched ballistic missile.

**Gottemoeller:** Well the most important thing is that we would have the right to bring the issue up and to, yes indeed, try to get them to talk to us about it. But I think that the treaty provisions are such that we can at least engage in conversation. It would be much farther down the road. That's why I think it would need to fall under a new treaty, what exactly the inspection regime would look like for new kinds of this type.

**Moderator:** Catherine and then Jennifer.

**Audience:** [Inaudible], CS News.

I wanted to know just how secure the Russian nuclear arsenal is? And there's a lot of open source reporting about limited military exercises between the Russians and the Chinese. Is this relationship a factor in our negotiations going forward? And [inaudible] China in the tent before they [inaudible]?

**Gottemoeller:** The Russians and the Chinese have had a

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

longstanding relationship. It goes back with [inaudible] and starts over many, many decades, and sometimes it's been warmer than at other times. At times they have had [shooting] going on in their relationship in the 1960s when there was even worry at that time that there would be a nuclear weapon launched from the Soviet Union to China. So in the late '60s it was a very low point in the relationship.

They're at a warmer point now. But my personal view is that that is a relationship that is geostrategic, not particularly based on warmth or trust. And --

**Audience:** Opportunistic?

**Gottemoeller:** A bit, for both capitals as they see an opportunity perhaps to exert some further influence in the Asia Pacific region. But I also think that they do not trust each other. My personal view is that the 9M729 intermediate range ground-launched missile was largely built because of concern by the Russians about the proliferation of these kinds of missiles in Asia. Not only among the Chinese, but North Korea, the Indians, the Pakistanis. Putin himself has said that publicly.

So it's not always easy to discern exactly where they are on the spectrum of warmth or coldness, but at the moment they happen to be in a pretty warm place. And yes, we watched from NATO headquarters with great interest the so-called Vostok exercises last year where they tried out some new conventional cooperation on training and operations.

So I think we have to keep a close eye on it, but I wouldn't think that we need to panic by any means.

I furthermore think we ought to try to figure out a way to encourage the Russians to help with some of these problems of getting China to the table. If they do have such, at the moment, a warm relationship with the Chinese, they should be helping to get them to come to the table and to begin to discuss some of these issues on a broader front. That's why I watched with interest the so-called P-5 process which we started back a decade ago. They have agreed now to begin to discuss so-called strategic stability issues. I think, and if I were in the administration, urge the Russians to work in that P5 context as well as in a bilateral context to try to get the Chinese to play ball more on talking about the strategic stability and nuclear

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

policy questions.

**Morrison:** The way I look at it, this partnership of convenience may not be much more durable than the relationship between Xi and Putin. And --

**Audience:** -- by personality?

**Morrison:** It may be. They like to make pancakes together. They like to do vodka shots. We've seen that. But if you go through their systems, I mentioned General Ashley. General Ashley in his comments last May talked about the warheads that Russia's building, the non-strategic weapons Russia relies on to deter and defeat NATO or China. They target China. Some of the new types of strategic weapons, the new warhead capabilities with new military capabilities, there's a lot of religiosity in the debate over nuclear weapons, over what constitutes new.

The Russians build new nuclear weapons, and they build, for example General Ashley said, new high yield and earth penetrating warheads to attack hardened military targets like the U.S., allied and Chinese command and control systems. So the question is, the Russian military feels the need to still target China with nuclear weapons. How deep is that partnership?

During the previous administration, I think Rose will recall, the Russian equivalent of Rose, Sergei Ryabkov, who's still there, went around talking about, this is 2013 and 2014, the importance of multilateralizing arms control. So in some respects you could argue this was an idea they started floating because much like their calculus in INF, they were worried about the new nuclear players on the field.

The U.S. starts proposing the idea of multilateralizing arms control and suddenly the Russians get nervous. The question is, are the Russians nervous because they've suddenly decided multilateralizing arms control doesn't make as much sense as it did in 2013? Or is it because big brother in Beijing has said hey we don't like this. This is not, China doesn't want to be a part of arms control if we can continue to get out of this and do whatever we want without these kinds of limits. Is it because China has said look, the Americans are clearly just trying to drive a wedge between us, even though this was originally a Russian idea? There's a lot of questions about the durability of this relationship post these two Presidents for life.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

**Audience:** I asked about the security of the arsenal.

**Gottemoeller:** We made a big investment after the breakup of the Soviet Union starting in the 1990s and through the so-called Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Investing in physical security at Russian nuclear sites, both fissile material storage facilities and also warhead facilities.

So we did 20 years ago start to invest in that and worked very cooperatively with the Russians for 20 years to put a good amount of funding into it.

Frankly, the Russians cut us off from that cooperation about a decade ago. So I personally am not quite as sure as I was ten years ago that the physical protection of the warheads and fissile material was up to snuff. Perhaps there are, Tim you've been in more recently than I have, perhaps you know of some continued efforts by the Russians, but I haven't seen a whole lot of attention to that on the Russian side just as a matter of kind of their open policy. It's kind of gone behind the scenes again. It was super secret during the Soviet era. And when we were working together with them, they were ready to talk more openly about the necessity of good physical protection as well as controlled accounting of nuclear assets. But now it's kind of gone quiet again and I don't have a good feel as to whether or not that level of standards is the same nowadays.

**Morrison:** I think Rose is exactly right. Back in the previous administration, the Obama administration, they actually kicked us out. First, they refused to extend the Nunn-Lugar program. We replaced it with something called MNEPR, and forgive me, I can't remember for the life of me what that acronym means. Rose, do you remember? But they kicked us out because they simply did not want American boots on the ground keeping an eye on our investments.

So the press is full of reporting about examples where Russian origin nuclear fissile material has been found in various criminal networks. One of the questions whenever one of those incidents happens is, did this just get out? Or did this get out during the fall of the Soviet Union? And it's not always easy to tell. But I'm less concerned with somebody walking off with a Russian nuclear warhead. I'm more concerned about somebody walking off with some Russian plutonium.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

Putin's pretty good at running a police state to control his people, though, so I think we should be somewhat more confident about his ability to control these things, but we just can't really have the same level of eyes on the ground that we used to.

**Moderator:** Jennifer and then Tara.

**Audience:** Jennifer Griffin, Fox News.

One clarification. Is it correct to say that if you renegotiate New START you want to bring the Chinese into those negotiations?

And what is your assessment of why Putin is in a hurry and why he has leverage?

And lastly, in the wake of the Soleimani killing, do we see any evidence that the Iranians want to renegotiate the nuclear deal? Or is it too early to tell?

**Morrison:** I'll take the last one first. I think the Iranians are going to wait out the present administration and see if they can get an administration of a different party that maybe tries to go back in the JCPOA.

The JCPOA would effectively be defunct anyway because it's a temporary deal. So the limitations, the conventional arms embargo, that lifts in 2020 anyway. The terms of the deal were always temporary, so at some point it becomes difficult to get back into a deal that's about to expire.

With respect to B, I can't honestly tell you why Putin's in such a hurry. I think he looks for opportunities to try to divide us from our allies. If he can accomplish two things in this world before he departs, it would be to try to reestablish some sort of Novorossiya, not quite the Soviet Union but a bigger Russia. If I were in Belarus right now I'd be pretty nervous. I think he also wants to try to divide NATO. If he can cause the downfall of NATO -- NATO worked very well together on INF. It was a credit to NATO leadership and others. But I think if he starts talking about the importance of extending New START now and the administration is trying to pursue another deal, that just makes them nervous in Berlin, it makes them nervous in Paris for reasons I don't entirely understand, why they're nervous in Paris. They have the Force de Frappe. But I think that's -- so

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

it's unclear exactly what Putin's calculus is. I tend to look at it as if he's pushing for it, it's probably because he sees an advantage. Either he wants to keep us locked into New START or he wants to try to find opportunities to draw wedges, drive wedges between us and our allies.

Question one was?

**Audience:** Do you want to bring China into the New START.

**Morrison:** It's not about bringing China into New START. The New START construct wouldn't work to bring China in. It's about replacing New START, if we can, with a larger deal. A deal that doesn't just cover strategic weapons. It covers all of the weapons. It doesn't just cover Russia, because Russia just isn't that important anymore, it brings China into the equation as well.

So the question is, do you extend New START while you're negotiating that larger deal? Frank Miller and Eric Edelman wrote a great OpEd I guess last week or the week before talking about using New START as leverage to try to get that larger deal. So it's not about bringing China into New START. It's not a construct that makes sense for the Chinese nuclear force.

**Gottemoeller:** That's exactly what I was going to say. We're not talking about NSC renegotiation, we're talking about a whole new treaty. I think that's a good thing, frankly. I'd say to the administration, go for it. Try and get it done.

But one thing I would say, well, a couple of points.

The way the expansion program of New START is written, it's written so that it remains in place four to five years, so from '21 to '26, or until superseded by a new treaty. So it's not as if the administration is stuck with New START for another five years. Go for it. Work on the new treaty. Get it done. And then New START would be superseded by the new treaty entering into force, by it being negotiated, agreed, ratified by [inaudible] ratification, and then we would move forward and New START would be superseded. So I think it is important to remember that.

It's interesting, the thought of looking not just at strategic weapons but all nuclear weapons. In my mind, I'll just return to



Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

the point I made earlier, I really think we need to focus on this burgeoning of delivery vehicle numbers, particularly in the intermediate ground-launched systems in Eurasia. That is why with the demise of the INF Treaty, which by the way [inaudible] the force, and I was fully supportive within NATO of that activity, of getting the allies to come along, because it was so clear. And because of --

**Moderator:** You mean dropping it.

**Gottemoeller:** Because of the information that the administration provided to the allies, the allies were able to determine for themselves that this new missile, the 9M729, is a violation of the New START Treaty.

So it was clear that it was time to move forward in the way we did, and the allies were all in agreement on that.

That said, I'm just wondering if are we asking the right questions? Is the first question that we have to ask is getting missile proliferation under control? And then that means negotiating limits on missile deployments. It doesn't mean some kind of airy fairy voluntary measures, but actually looking for ways to get missile deployments under control.

And think about controlling the nuclear warheads. I actually agree with trying to control the nuclear warheads. I think we have some new opportunities to do that these days because of the verification and inspection procedures under New START. They've given us new insights into how to verify warheads, monitor warhead deployments.

But to my mind these are things that we really need to consider carefully in terms of how do we get the Chinese to the table? I think you can make a case for the Chinese to come to the table early on intermediate range constraints of ground-launched missiles because they are staring at the possibility of a deployment of very capable U.S. missiles of this kind. So can we use that as leverage to get them to come to the table?

But I am concerned, they have so few warheads that if you put an emphasis on controlling their warheads, the incentive is for them to run the other direction rather than come to the table.

**Morrison:** I think the treaty can be extended for up to five

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

years. So the other advantage is it could be, it's up to five years. According to State Department lawyers, it's up to five years.

**Gottemoeller:** It's five years or until superseded by another treaty. Well, you are right, it could be -- I know I read with great interest the piece by Eric and Frank. I just worry about reverse leverage. The Russians are excellent negotiators. Two can play at this game. So you get to the point whatever it is in a year's time oh, how do the Russians turn the tables on us essentially. I worry about reverse leverage and we need to be concerned about that as well.

**Audience:** What might they do?

**Gottemoeller:** Well, depending on what period it is in our political season, it's hard to speculate, but what period it is in our political season, they might decide that they want to pull back and slow the roll-up for a while in the negotiations. It necessarily at that point will not be the case that they will embrace the notion of a further staged extension of New START.

That's why I say let us not play around with leverage in this case, but simply extend the thing for five years and then get done what we need to get done, which is to negotiate these new treaties. Let's just get on with what we need to do in negotiating new treaties.

I am concerned that there will be a lot of gamesmanship going on, and as I said, the Russians are excellent in that kind of game as well.

**Moderator:** Tara, then Hugh Gusterson.

**Audience:** I wanted to play off the question on warhead security, specifically the security of the B-51s at Incirlik. At what point is it necessary for the U.S. to remove these weapons? And at what point is Turkey too unstable of a NATO partner to house these for the U.S.?

**Morrison:** The U.S. doesn't acknowledge where we deploy nuclear weapons overseas if we do. But I think you should rest assured that, I think you can go back to previous examples of where the decision has been made that we have to pull weapons out of a country where we may have them deployed. We've done that before.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

That's not too far, not too distant past. I think that's an option that would always be available to a President. These are U.S. weapons. That's a conversation that we'd have to take into account, but I'm certainly not prepared to talk about where we may or may not keep these weapons today.

**Audience:** There were a number of reports earlier this fall that the U.S. was considering options for removing the weapons.

**Morrison:** That doesn't mean it's declassified. I'm too pretty to go to prison.

**Audience:** Do you have any thoughts on Turkey's ability to [inaudible] weapons?

**Gottemoeller:** You can hear that Tim and I are both former officials because we'll not say more than he's already said.

Can I just come back for a second to [Jeff Smith's] comment or question to me. I've been thinking about this a lot because in fact in the negotiation of the New START Treaty, START did go out of force in December of 2009. And that period was a critical one in the negotiations. We got up and over and continued the negotiations because there was a larger political emphasis on both sides to get finally to yes in this new strategic reduction negotiation.

But the Russians tried to leverage that end game of START going out of force in December to get some particular things, and we pushed back effectively and hard, and in the end of the day there was a bit of panic that suddenly we'd be without boots on the ground and so forth and so on. But when they saw that we were firm in not allowing ourselves to be leveraged in that end game, they simply went on to continue the negotiations and get it done by April of that year.

So I do worry about them playing some games as well. So I wanted to bring that specific example to bear because you asked me if I had an example. It took me a minute to pull it out of the gray matter.

But yeah. Sorry, I'm not going to comment further on Turkey.

**Moderator:** Hugh, then Paul.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

**Audience:** I was at an event at CSIS earlier today where someone in the audience from the National War College asked a very interesting question. The panel misunderstood the question and flubbed the answer. So I'm hoping you might be able to do better.

The question that was asked, the person proposed a new kind of treaty, a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia that would either restrict or freeze pit production. I'm wondering what your response to that would be.

And just at first glance you can see an audience advantage to the U.S. The U.S. lost its pit production capability when Rocky Flats was closed in an environmental scandal after an FBI investigation at the end of the Cold War. Over the last decade the U.S. has been attempting to create a new pit production facility at Los Alamos. They've come up with I think three different proposed facilities, all of which have crashed and burned. At the moment they're proposing to spend billions of dollars on two pit production facilities at Los Alamos and Savannah River, so presumably there will be savings to the U.S. taxpayer and you would restrict Russian capability that already exists in exchange for restricting a notional American capability that does not yet exist.

So is there any juice in this proposal?

**Gottemoeller:** It's very, very difficult to consider how to structure an agreement of this kind because it would, in order to be implementable it would presumably require some pretty intrusive inspection into our most sensitive operations. Pit production for our nuclear warheads.

So perhaps you could come up with a very largescale agreement which, just as you said, would trade one of the new facilities for somehow closing down or constraining Russian production facilities, which we would then implement by depending on our national technical means. But as always, in this sensitive area I have questions about our ability to negotiate a verifiable agreement. So that's number one.

The other point is, I feel differently nowadays about warhead verification. Warheads that are already produced. Because I think we know enough about warheads on missiles in the New START Treaty and our reentry vehicle on-site inspections in New START.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

So I think the association between warheads and missiles and how production facilities, not production facilities, but storage facilities are organized and maintained. I think it's going to be complicated and difficult, but I do agree with the current administration that it is time to try to tackle some of these difficult issues.

The reason that warheads have never been included in a nuclear arms limitation or reduction negotiation up to this point is that it's been way too sensitive to try to verify their absence or presence on the front of a missile or associated with a bomber in a particular storage facility, but I think we're getting to the point now we can figure out how to do that.

But pit production, I have my doubts.

**Morrison:** If we halt, if we cannot produce pits, that is a one-way ticket to disarmament. And I for one don't support a world without nuclear weapons. A.

But B, we are farther behind in terms of the pits we have and the weapons we need. Like I said, we [invented] the stuff and North Korea can produce [as many] pits as we can. That's just where we are because of the [accuracy] of our nuclear complex. So I see it as a one-way ticket to nuclear disarmament, and I don't support that.

**Audience:** What about an agreement where you give you the facility at Los Alamos but build the one at Savannah River? And as Rose suggested, the Russians maybe close one of their facilities. So you don't freeze pit production, but you have numerical limits on the number that can be made?

**Morrison:** I don't know what you gain from that. The bulk of the pits wouldn't be produced at Los Alamos [inaudible]. They'd be produced at Savannah River if we can ever actually do this. So I think there are more effective ways to get a more meaningful [inaudible].

**Moderator:** Paul then Nick.

**Audience:** You talked earlier about both Presidents Putin and Xi as presidents for life. [Inaudible] both [inaudible] announcement today about the constitutional changing involving the cabinet. It's highly unclear what it is he's doing.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

[Inaudible] his successor, [inaudible] successor to take over for him when he leaves power.

So I'd like to get your general impression about the announcement today and whether you think, on this subject, whether that appears to change calculations or the U.S. approach for the negotiations in the future.

**Gottemoeller:** I for one feel like we need some time to digest this announcement and what's happening in Russia, because it's all happening in a fairly fast-moving way. It took the Russian body politic by surprise, at least in terms of the media and the public. Probably on the inside they knew what was happening, but in a small group on the inside.

I do agree with some of the analyses I've seen that say what he appears to be doing in transforming the National Security Council is to transform it into a modern politburo. So it's kind of an absolute college of leaders who will be the ones who are making the decisions inside a black box. So again, the notion of democratization in Russia already very weak and dying, probably at this point killed off entirely.

But nevertheless, I would say that we're not yet clear exactly what this means for the succession, particularly. The question I had today, all right, we know that Medvedev has been asked to resign as Prime Minister and has gone into this new politburo, the National Security Council, as the deputy there. But what does it mean in terms of where Putin himself will land going forward? Some have suggested he'll head back to the Prime Minister position and strengthen the position of Prime Minister in the context of strengthening the parliament. And others have suggested that he is on the hunt for a successor now, and that this is the kind of starting gun in terms of rolling out the succession process.

At the moment I can't tell you which it is. But I do think this is a big and important step.

In terms of negotiating with them and what it means, they're very active now in foreign policy terms, and it doesn't seem to be putting a crimp in Sergei Lavrov's travel schedule at the moment. So in a way I kind of doubt -- you know, they have a very capable really Ministry of Foreign Affairs and structure of government and a certain regard for continuing to conduct their foreign

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

policy and pursue their objectives.

**Morrison:** It's too soon to say. We used to look at this when I was on the inside, which saying it that way makes it sound like I was in prison in some respects. [Laughter]. But people would ask how much is Putin worth? How much has he stolen from the Russian people? I talked to an expert in the intelligence community one time and they said think about the GDP of Russia and that's it.

So the question is, how does he protect that? It's tough to protect that much wealth if you don't control the apparatus of the state. So whatever it is that he's doing, whatever redrawing of the lines of the org chart he's undertaking for whatever purpose, I find it difficult to imagine that he's not going to somehow use it to stay in power and to protect what he's stolen from the Russian people.

I also have to say, we used to spend some time thinking about after Putin leaves, probably feet first, who succeeds him? The potential successors, none of them are pretty. We don't have the [inaudible] waiting in the wings.

**Audience:** Does that make Putin any more dangerous? That acknowledgement and perhaps acting upon it today? What he might be prepared to do using Russia's security structure?

**Morrison:** He's already doing it all against the Russian people.

**Gottemoeller:** You mean in terms of military? Sorry, Tim. Go ahead.

**Morrison:** I was going to say, making him more dangerous to whom? He's already wielding all the tools that he has to stay in power against his own people. Does it make him more dangerous to the West? Does it make him more dangerous to us? I don't know that it makes him more dangerous to us until we feel like he's actually getting pushed out. Like his ability to stay in power is actually in question. I see no evidence that his ability to stay in power is in question right now. He's redrawing the lines on the org chart because for some reason he thinks it's politically expedient. If it's to start to anoint his successor or just because he think it would just be a little too unpopular to amend the constitution again, he's not quite confident that he can go in and form some sort of [inaudible] say with Belarus, for

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

example. I can't tell you exactly why he's doing it, but I do not see any scenario where he's not in power.

**Gottemoeller:** At the moment, one last point on this. At the moment, too, they are playing hard in a couple of diplomatic arenas. Libya's a good example. He's working with other leaders like Erdogan and so forth, but they're headed to a meeting in Berlin to try to put in place a stable ceasefire and restart the peace process in Libya. So he's, a bit, he's playing the role of the great statesman at the moment. So tactically, I don't think this is the moment when he's going to launch military adventures. He's got too much to gain in terms of upping the geostrategic street credibility of the Russian Federation. That's the game that's afoot as far as he's concerned at the moment in the context of the Russians see it of a kind of vacuum emanating from Washington. So that's one thing to consider.

The other thing is, and we saw it at NATO all the time, they are already very active in the non-kinetic space. Cyber attacks and so forth. Hybrid tactics are already very much part of how they are contesting NATO and its presence.

I did want to comment, though, that the demise of NATO Has been a Soviet and Russian objective since the '50s so it has been a longstanding reality that anything that Moscow can do to weaken NATO, they are going to do.

**Moderator:** Nick Shifren and then John Hudson.

**Audience:** Nick Shifren from [Inaudible] News Hour.

Forgive my instinct for trying to accentuate where you disagree. I had a couple of questions.

To Tim, what about Rose's point that there would be an advantage to discussing and starting to negotiate New START, especially when it comes to some of these new weapons. The President has not been shy to step away from negotiations he doesn't like. Why not start negotiations and see how it goes?

And to Rose, to Tim's point, you yourself mentioned the aversion of Russia feeling pressure and actually caving a little bit. So why not run the calendar toward the end of the year. As Tim was saying, could it be possible the U.S. could gain some leverage in those months before New START actually expires, and then what's



Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

wrong with doing that?

**Morrison:** For me, I don't see it as a question of the negotiation, we extend it or we don't. The extent to which it was a negotiation is, if I'm right and it's up to five years, for how long do we extend it? So I would worry about getting into a situation where we sit down with Russia and we start going through things in the New START Treaty we might want to change.

Again, I see --

**Audience:** [Inaudible]?

**Morrison:** For example the Russians have made it clear that they want to renegotiate things that they didn't like, that came out of the previous administration's negotiation over, for example, how we converted our SSBNs. We negotiated very clearly how we would convert our SSBNs. They don't like it. They want us to change it. And to quote a famous general, "Nuts."

We specifically negotiated that we would dual-base our B-52 heavy bombers. They don't like that. I don't know what Rose and Mike had to do in order to preserve that language that allows us to dual-base our bombers, but they want to go in and they want to change that.

No. We negotiated that. We're not reopening parts of the treaty that they don't like to say maybe they're reopening parts of the treaty that we don't like.

I am just not that concerned about the systems Putin exhibited in March of 2018. Again, I see it as classic magician's misdirection. I don't see him being able to build a significant quantity of most of these systems. I don't see that in any way they change first strike or second strike stability to the extent that they actually pose some new threat. I see them as pure distraction and we should not go down that rabbit hole with them.

**Audience:** By dual-based you mean comingled conventional capable and --

**Morrison:** Right. Yeah.

**Gottemoeller:** Russia's feeling the pressure. Could it be possible the U.S. could gain leverage? Of course it's possible

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

to be clever always about these things. But I do want to point out that we've successfully levered the Russians pretty far up to this point. I think the President should feel good about how far they have come. Not six months ago, and Tim will remember this, they had a significant list of conditions in place for what would cause them to want to extend New START, one of which was dealing with these very questions of the SLBMs, the Trident tubes, and also the B-52s. And they've dropped that. They've dropped their condition about bringing it before the parliament, which is quite right, ridiculous, as Tim said. But they could have used that as a stopper function for moving forward until they got some juice out of us.

So we've levered them pretty hard. I think the President should take credit for that. And at this point I think what I would like to see is a stable environment moving forward for the negotiations, but first and foremost for our triad modernization.

**Morrison:** You might have achieved your objective of accentuating our differences. I don't believe the administration believes that Putin said that he wanted an unconditional extension. That he dropped, for example, his beefs on convergence. That's not how they're reading exactly what he said. There's significant concern that what he's saying is we want to start talking about extension right away, but he didn't actually drop their issues on conversion.

I may be wrong, the administration may be wrong. We may hear that when they come back from Vienna. But I believe the administration still believes that no, those sort of preconditions are still on the table.

**Gottemoeller:** From my review of what the Russians have had to say, I don't agree with that. But you're right, we're going to have to see what comes back from Vienna. My view is that they are allowing those issues now to fall back into the implementation body of the New START Treaty, the Bilateral Consultative Commission where they will continue to be worked as essentially an implementation matter under the treaty, but not cause them to halt an effort to extend.

**Moderator:** John Hudson and then Aaron.

**Audience:** Tim this is kind of a simplistic way of asking the question, but you mentioned that you hate a situation where the

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

President doesn't have a lot of options when he's coming up right against the deadline for extension. In the situation where he was right against the deadline and the Chinese never ended up playing ball, what would you recommend in a situation like that?

**Morrison:** I don't know. We simply didn't ask that question, and I don't know where I would come down on that today. It would depend on other issues. Where are we with our INF deployments where we, with our modernization. I mean Rose was exactly right. They started modernizing their capabilities 10 or 15 years ago, and they are 80 or so percent done now according to DIA in public comments. We are just beginning to bend metal. There's a number of factors. It's simply not an analysis that we ever understood when I was there, and I would demure on taking a position right now.

**Audience:** What do you feel about this view from [inaudible] some areas of the nonproliferation world that view this idea of a trilateral agreement as sort of a clever distraction that some of the nonproliferation skeptics in the administration put forward in order to help run out the clock? Because they actually ultimately didn't want an extension to happen.

**Morrison:** You've hit on a pet peeve of mine. Let's be clear what we're talking about. We're not talking about nonproliferation. We're talking about arms control. Nonproliferation is what we do with North Korea and Iran.

I don't know what to say about that. That's nonsense by people who, most of whom have never served in government. A lot of the talk I see about oh, extending New START is fundraising for 501C3s that need to raise money every year.

There's been no discussion undertaken in the administration not to extend the treaty. This is something that the President has looked at quite closely. He has been asked by various world leaders including Putin, let's just go ahead and extend New START, and he says I want to talk about getting more of the nuclear weapons under control. So I can't speak to people who are just uninformed.

**Moderator:** Aaron and then Deb.

**Audience:** Aaron [Inaudible], Defense News.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

[Inaudible] allies for a second on [inaudible]. [Inaudible] noticed that the INF process went pretty smoothly with NATO allies who [inaudible]. What's your status of where they are in terms of both New START and Open Skies? In Open Skies there's been a lot of pushback from the European partners on [inaudible] and things like that. [Inaudible].

How important is it to get them on board with what happens next? How likely is it we'll be able to get them on board with what happens next?

**Gottemoeller:** Since I just came back from Brussels not so very long ago, and in fact the allies, I mentioned a while ago, the allies, it was a long, hard slog. When I was the Under Secretary they were not interested in what was already a clear violation. This was back in May of 2013, well, May of '13 was when I first raised it with the Russians, but I had gone in January of that year to talk to the allies. And they simply didn't believe it. There were many differences among the allies as to whether this missile amounted to a violation of the treaty.

Again, as I mentioned a few moments ago, I give a great amount of credit to this administration for getting, pumping out the information to the allies that allowed them to make the determination for themselves that they had before them a missile that was violating the INF Treaty. So it was a consensus decision. They weren't happy, though, because INF along with other nuclear arms treaties over the years are seen as a significant factor in stability and security for the entire alliance. Not just in the bilateral U.S.-Russia/Soviet context. And as you know, INF was born out of considerable concern about stability and security in Europe back in the 1980s.

So a lot of attention to these matters historically, and frankly, a lot of attention nowadays because of the upheaval in the nuclear arms control arenas and also in the case of Open Skies in the conventional realm as well.

The allies see the Open Skies Treaty, and I understand that they have made their views known to the administration, as serving a number of purposes, some of which have to do with the fact that they do not themselves have overhead collection capabilities, and with the Open Skies Treaty they get information that is completely unclassified and sharable and they can make good use of it in any number of policy arenas.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

They also see it as an important means of building mutual predictability and confidence. It's hard to believe in this era with what's going on in the Donbas and in Crimea, but there is an importance that the allies place on having some mutual predictability in order to avoid dangerous accidents and incidents with the Russians. So they see Open Skies as serving a role in that arena.

And finally, they also see it as serving a role in real-time diplomacy. For example the Sea of Azov incident in November of 2018. The allies within a very short few weeks of that incident were flying Open Skies flights over Ukraine in order to signal resolve to the Russian Federation with regard to moving forward to find some resolution of that particular crisis. So they also see it as having an importance as a diplomatic tool as well.

So those are the kinds of arguments that they have made to the administration. I imagine, that's what I was hearing before I left Brussels, and there could be other arguments that they brought to play which I'm not privy to at the present time.

The non-strategic New START Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty that is still in force. They are unanimous in their support of sustaining and maintaining the New START Treaty.

**Morrison:** I think the INF exercise was very interesting, building on the good work from the previous administration to begin to educate the allies. But what was clear to us when the President made his decision and we started to brief it to allies, the universal request was, we need more time. Well more time for what? We've been doing this with you since what, July of 2014. Well, we never believed, this is what we hear from allies. We never believed it would get to this point, so we simply haven't talked to our people about this. We haven't talked to our publics. And you have to understand, this is, we're still at a generation of leaders across NATO capitals, many of whom got into politics because of the dual track approach in the early 1980s. Angela Merkel was an activist in East Germany against U.S. INF deployments. So these people cut their teeth and got into politics because of this. And they never actually believed that the treaty might go away. They surely didn't have the conversation with their people to explain what the issues were.

So ultimately when the President decided to sequence the

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

withdrawal the way he did based on consultations with allies it was because of the request for more time from allies to talk to their people, to explain what we had been talking to them, policymakers to policymakers, going back to Under Secretary Gottemoeller in 2014.

So I agree completely that it is important to have the allies on board or at least to try to get them on board, which again, is one of the reasons why I'd like to see a Special Envoy appointed. And to be perfectly clear, I don't want the damn job. That's where I got in trouble at the State Department.

But to start talking to allies, consult with the NAC about what it is that we're doing and why we're doing it. And it's tougher to keep the allies on board with us if we can't have those kinds of discussions, if there isn't that kind of clear process and leadership team to go have these consultations with them.

On Open Skies, we'll accentuate the differences again, I do believe NATO wants to maintain Open Skies. I have no question about that. If the U.S. withdraws, Open Skies doesn't go away. They can all keep flying over each other's countries at will. It's just a question of will Russia be able to continue to over-fly us. Based on the clear concerns from the national security community about what Russia is really doing when they fly these aircraft over us, if the allies want to have --

**Moderator:** What are they concerned about?

**Morrison:** They're concerned about what Russia is -- this is a confidence and transparency building measure. It's not arms control.

**Moderator:** But what are the Russians doing flying --

**Morrison:** I'm getting there.

The first question about the treaty is, how has confidence building been working between us and Russia since this treaty came into place? Are we more or less confident about Russia? How does it support transparency since it came into place? Do we have more or less transparency in Russia since this treaty came into force?

I would argue on both counts we have less of that.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

DIA, other leaders, Admiral Haney when he was at STRATCOM, was very clear that the kinds of infrastructure Russia is flying over repeatedly, and that was back when they had a wet film camera as opposed to a digital electro-optical camera as opposed to where they will be going with an infrared camera -- what are they doing with that? And we have a fairly good idea of what they're doing with it, and I'm not going to talk about here because again, I don't want to be passed around in a federal prison for a pack of Lucky Strikes. But we have a very good idea of how they're using this to undermine us.

And this gets to the point of asymmetry. Yes, we have NTM and the Europeans by and large do not. Some of them do. But for this kind of unclassified imagery that is so important to the allies, I'll get you a \$70 subscription to Digital Globe and you can get the same kind of unclassified commercial imagery of a higher resolution than you can get with an Open Skies plane. So we can check that box for them.

There is a proposition that has been put in front of the allies. If you think it's that important for the United States to stay in this treaty. It's been reported, I think it was in Defense One, or maybe Defense News, excuse me. If you think it's that important for us to stay in this treaty, here are a list of things you can do to help us mitigate our concerns. The question will be, will our allies who think this treaty is so important, the think it's so important for us to stay, are they prepared to take any of the steps that have been presented to them to help us address the kinds of concerns that we have? Because, for example, we have a fairly elaborate nuclear command and control system, we have fairly elaborate critical infrastructure capabilities. But by and large, the Europeans do not. They don't have to protect some of the same kind of equities we do. And when Putin flies over Bedminster and he flies over the White House as he did in 2017, you begin to worry about the continuity of the presidency, and that's a concept that by and large doesn't exist throughout most of Europe.

**Moderator:** I want to try and end this pretty close to nine, as everyone's got lives to leave. We've got five more people who would like to speak. Could I ask you both to keep it pretty short. And if the question's mostly to you, Rose, the maybe Tim don't bother, and vice versa. Just so we can give everyone a chance.

Professional Word Processing & Transcribing  
(801) 556-7255

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

Deb [Rikeman] followed by her competitor, Tim Gardner.

**Audience:** I'm trying to understand how much of a priority arms control is to the White House at this point. And I'm trying to figure out why we don't have anybody at State. And has the absence of Bolton changed the work that's being done on this issue? And do you think that Trump's going to handle this negotiation the same way he handled North Korea, Kim, and with a top-down perspective rather than a working level up?

**Morrison:** When I was still in the administration it was fairly clear who was driving arms control policy, and it was the President. These were his wishes, these were his directions. So again, that's why I believe, and if you're going to draw the analogy to North Korea or other constructs, in those cases when he's wanted to have that kind of control, he has appointed Special Envoys and he's worked directly with them, and one of them is now the Deputy Secretary of State and is still apparently doing this work which --

So we'll have to see. If he decides based on where we go with the calendar and based on discussions that are being held I think right now with Russia and hopefully in the near term with China, does he decide again well, okay, this isn't going anywhere. I've been reelected or not. How will I handle the question of extension of the New START Treaty. I can't speak to why people aren't in the seat at State. The Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control resigned. The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control resigned or was forced out depending upon which newspapers you read. I can't speak to why they haven't been replaced.

**Audience:** Tim Gardner, Reuters.

When NPT comes up in April, I wanted to touch on nonproliferation for a second. Should the U.S. make it more difficult for countries to withdraw? Try to make that effort? Could they? It certainly seems like a way a country could make a [inaudible] they wanted to.

**Gottemoeller:** An interesting question. Since the contretemps' now 30 years old over North Korea's attempt to withdraw from the NPT, this has been a hearty perennial at the NPT Review Conference. Do we need to somehow strengthen the withdrawal



Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

clause of the NonProliferation Treaty. I'm sure it will come up again in this context at the NPT Review Conference.

But in a way, there's a wide range of issues confronting the NPT Review Conference that are related to the burgeoning capability also in Iran as the Iran nuclear deal goes away. It's related also to weapons of mass destruction, the notion of a free zone in the Middle East. I continue to be concerned that that issue will be back front and center in the negotiations. And frankly, there is a great deal of concern about the health of the disarmament filler of the NPT, so I think that issue is very much going to be front and center.

I for one have welcome in my own time the discussions of whether or not we need to strengthen the withdrawal clause of the NPT. I just don't think it's going to be at the head of the list this time because there are so many other issues. I'd be interested, Tim, if you see otherwise, if you've heard others talk about it as a very important issue.

**Morrison:** Not to be glib, but I sometimes find it difficult to articulate the difference between a successful Rev Con and a failed Rev Con. The Rev Con failed in 2015, we're still all here. If it fails in 2020, I don't believe it ultimately, fundamentally makes that big of a difference.

**Moderator:** Three more speakers. Michael Gordon, then Brian and Michael will finish up.

**Audience:** I have a basic question. The resolution of ratification for New START says at the next Arms Control Accord you're going to cover the non-strategic battlefield systems, right? And that's something maybe Tim you can add [inaudible]. And the White House concept is to cover all nuclear weapons.

My basic question, and this is, if I can find a difference between you guys it's [inaudible] so much, is why is that so important? Why do we care so much about the battlefield systems given that the Russians say they don't want to put them on the table. They can't reach us. We've got other means of striking them.

**Morrison:** Not true. They can reach us.

**Audience:** Okay. Why would we, if you had to choose between a

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

new arms control accord and constraining their long-range systems, or no arms control accord because you can't cover all nuclear weapons, why wouldn't you choose the former?

And Rose, what's your perspective on why is it so important to cover the shorter range nuclear systems and perhaps do so because of [inaudible]?

**Morrison:** I would just offer, it's unclear to me that it is that zero sum, that it would come at the cost of a new agreement. It may, but that's ultimately a choice the President would make and there would be a series of factors.

The reason I said I disagree is, for example, because of the history of arms control and the way we've done these things. At one point, some of these rules favored us. They now I would argue favor Russia. A submarine-launched ballistic missile is limited by New START. A submarine-launched cruise missile that may very well have the same yield of a warhead and it's fired by a similar platform, that could also be 500 miles off the coast, is not limited. That is a weapon that can hit CONUS. It can threaten us. To say nothing of several hundred thousand American troops deployed in Europe or deployed in Asia. To say nothing of treaty allies, Article 5 security guarantees with Korea and Japan where U.S. troops would A, be in the cross hairs; and B, we would have a treaty obligation to respond if those weapons were used against them.

So there are non-strategic weapons that can range us, A. And B, I don't know that I accept the premise, we may be there in November or December, that it actually is a choice between covering these and covering nothing.

**Gottemoeller:** You're quite right, Michael, that the easiest way to get a new deal rapidly is to do an additional reduction, basically lower the number of operationally deployed warheads, for example, by up to one-third. That would be one way to proceed. That would be the easiest way to get a new deal quickly.

But I for one have welcomed the notion of trying finally to tackle non-strategic nuclear weapons because frankly, I tie it to the demise of the INF Treaty and the fact that we are very concerned about proliferation of these systems in the hands of the Chinese.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

We may be at a point where we could actually get the Chinese to agree to, in the best case, a ban on nuclear armed intermediate range ground-launched systems because now, as I am convinced, can verify such a ban. Or if they're not willing to go that far, we may be able to get them to constrain, to limit those numbers. Again, in the face of an upcoming deployment of U.S. intermediate range ground-launched systems in Asia.

So I think it's time to move on to this phase, to try to begin to get a handle on warhead constraints, reductions and eliminations in a negotiated setting. We've never been able to do it before, but I think the time is ripe now.

**Moderator:** Michael Elliott, then Brian.

**Audience:** I'm going to try and string together a couple of thoughts after listening to this, and Mike I think the short answer to your question is the number 67. You've got to get ratification of the treaty and get 67 votes. If you can't get an inspection and verification regime that would do the due diligence necessary on non-strategic weapons, that would be the problem, and that's exactly what we struggled with the last time. We have to be able to come up with a mechanism to do that.

A couple of thoughts, and some of these are going to come as questions that you can answer for yourselves.

It took years to negotiate the original START Treaty. It took eight years, because both sides were losing, they were learning a process, notwithstanding two different languages. They were learning the language of arms control. That treaty now, the offshoot of it has stood for 24 years, the benefit of that eight year process they went through including the New START Treaty in which we have an inspection and verification regime that all sides, both side shave been able to rely on.

At the very beginning of this somebody made a comment about, I think it was Rose, made a comment about all the inspections we get to use and the notifications of what that does for our confidence and what's going on. It works both ways. The Russians are getting the same notifications. And we want Russians that are confident that they're not under attack from our national security perspective.

Professional Word Processing & Transcribing  
(801) 556-7255

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

So what about having a new treaty? Well, the one we've got's going to expire in 54 weeks. I've been telling people this for a long time. It took us 50 weeks to negotiate the New START Treaty start to finish. That doesn't count the time that Rose was taking [getting] through the Senate and confirmed so that she could even do that process. That was from the time they showed up the first day until the time that treaty was signed by the President. Fifty weeks. That's really fast. And I'll tell you, the stress on a treaty that was basically starved, skinned down to do the things that we could do in the amount of time is what it was, and it was a significant reduction [inaudible], but it wasn't all the new ground we're talking about right now and how challenging that would be.

Now add in a third party, the Chinese, who really probably don't want to be there anyway is a real problem.

So if that's the case, the best we can do is up to, I don't want to argue with State Department lawyers, but up to five more years. In five years after 2021. So February 5, '26, this treaty's expiring period. There's no way of saving it after that. There's no renegotiation in this and getting through the Senate. It's over at that point.

So what that tells me is we've got almost six years to sort out a really difficult next follow-on treaty that may or may not involve any significant reductions. There's arms control and there's an arms reduction communities out there. There are a lot of people that absolutely want us to go lower. The DoD would look real hard at advice and consent to the President on what they could do. But where they are on that right now, I don't know.

So the questions we have to ask ultimately, and this is what the President's going to have to ask, and by the way, I don't speak in any way, shape or form for this government. I'm in a different world now. They have to answer the question, is whatever we do for a new treaty in the U.S.' best interest. It's clear to me that the Russians have concluded that an extension of this treaty is in their best interest, and they're willing to talk about whether or not a follow-on will have to be determined from that.

I then ask myself, if it does expire, what are we going to give up? The first thing we're going to give up is that inspection

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

regime that's been going on for at that point it will be 25 years. The habitual relationship of two governments talking to each other about issues surrounding nuclear weapons. Whether we agree with your conversion process, whether we think you're moving missiles inside of areas that should be inspected. All the routine stuff that goes on in the treaty, we've had 25 years of experience in doing that.

In three years after that treaty expires it will block everyone in the Department of Defense out of the system that ever did it before and they'll be doing something else. It's going to take time to rebuild that if we do that. And that's not insignificant. It's back to the eight-year process and probably the ten years of implementation on that.

The inspection regime is important. What that was for the intelligence community, it was a complement to the normal intelligence collection they do on the Russians. It was confirmation of what they're doing.

I'll tell you, in the New START Treaty we did something that no one's every done before. We're taking the shrouds off of ICBMs and SLBMs and they get to count the bumps under there and how many there are. What that tells for our people, if there's three bumps and two things that are non-nuclear options, we know what else they're doing under there. We didn't have that before, and if New START goes away, that goes away with it.

So the questions I think you have to ask in the end is think about where Russia is in its nuclear weapons recapitalization process. I think they're very late in that process and that would tell me why they think they're in good shape, let's constrain them. It's better to hold onto the U.S. now.

We happen to be out of cycle from where they are because of how our systems aged differently. So we're five to six years away from really hitting our stride on the U.S. recapitalization. It's hard for me to imagine the Russians don't want to have us constrained when our [plan] starts cranking out stuff, whatever that stuff is.

I think those are the questions you should be asking yourselves on what's the logic behind should we extend New START, and then what kind of a new treaty we want to have after that. I think, my personal view is all those are good things to do, but it's

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

going to take a lot of time, and it's going to take more than the 50 weeks, 54 weeks we've got left.

**Audience:** I'll try to be brief because I don't want to get in the way of everyone going home.

Similar to Mike's point, thinking about the next treaty, Russia will almost certainly bring up its longstanding complaints not just about nuclear weapons but also about missile defense and about conventional weapons.

For most of the Cold War, nuclear arms control was pretty much equivalent to the word national security. That was the game. Now we've concentrated [inaudible] capability within the STRATCOM world. Is the U.S. government prepared, able, in [inaudible] terms, to engage the rest of the Joint Force world in a discussion about what would need to happen in a future agreement with Russia to either discuss conventional weapons, assess what we even have in terms of leverage or the ability to [inaudible], or do we have to sort of learn how to do that for the first time.

**Gottemoeller:** I would say that if you heard those questions from the Russians, and we did during the New START negotiations about missile defense, conventional prompt global strike, you're also going to be hearing those questions from the Chinese if you bring them to the table. And so it does get more complex, and we're going to have to figure out the rationale for continuing to leave those things outside of the treaty and make it compelling to a larger community, first and foremost the Chinese, because they will raise the same questions. Partially because at this moment they are in a more cooperative moment with the Russians and they will want to bolster their message. But I think they also have their own concerns. We heard a lot of concerns during the last administration about the deployment of THAAD, for example, in ROK. So they have concerns about what we're doing on the missile defense front.

So we're going to have to get ready to make the case, and make it in a compelling way, that we can proceed with nuclear arms limitation and reduction or nuclear arms control if we don't get as far as limitation and reduction without touching these other capabilities.

That's just to raise awareness about the additional difficulties that ensue.

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

**Moderator:** Rose, any last remarks?

**Gottemoeller:** No. I really have enjoyed this discussion quite a bit. I don't think actually that Tim and I do agree on everything, Michael, but nevertheless, it's been good to be on the same podium with him and have the opportunity to debate some of these important issues. So thank you, David, for giving us the opportunity.

**Morrison:** President Trump was very clear when he wrote out the Missile Defense Review that his administration will not negotiate over missile defense in any form. I've never believed that's a serious issue. The Russians have 64 nuclear armed interceptors protecting Moscow. How many nuclear armed interceptors do we have protecting any city in the United States? This is a distraction. And if we're going to talk about nuclear arms control, let's talk about nuclear arms control.

The idea that we would have to integrate with the Joint Force to negotiate conventional force limits, again, this is about nuclear arms control. I can't imagine that this administration or frankly another administration on the other side of the political spectrum would agree to any of those concessions. Mike and Rose can remember just how many times they had to say how many Our Father's and Hail Mary's, that under no circumstances would the New START Treaty limit missile defense, much less when you start talking to Senators and House Members about we're going to cut the number of tanks at bases in your districts. I mean, come on, it's not serious. The Russians and the Chinese know it's not serious. We do nuclear arms control.

**Moderator:** Any last remarks?

**Morrison:** No, it's great to be here. Thank you for the invitation. Rose, I appreciate the opportunity to sit next to you again as we did a couple of times at NATO. And thank you all for listening to something as dry and arcane as nuclear arms control.

**Moderator:** Thank you very much.

A reminder that the second in this series, this pair of dinner conversations on nuclear arms, most of you have signed up for both. I'm hoping you'll all come. It's Tuesday, March 17<sup>th</sup>,

Professional Word Processing & Transcribing  
(801) 556-7255

Nuclear Dinner - 1/15/2020

6:30. Same room, same drill. Michelle Flournoy, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; nuclear physicist Dr. James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment; and George Beebe of the Center for the National Interest, former CIA, former White House analyst on Russia. The three of them, topic, technological innovations. We've referred to some of them today. But could those innovations, whether they be Russian, Chinese or American, change the nuclear balance? What would be implications for policymakers if so?

It should be an interesting session. I hope you'll come. It's a little ways off. You will forget about this, we'll send you reminders. But thank you very much for coming. I personally thought this was bipartisan wonkery at its best.

# # # #